Pleasures in Terms of Morality and Physicality Stuart Mill

Pleasures In Terms of Morality and Physicality

      Mill is generally accepted as a utilitarian philosopher, however about some points, he is opposed to Bentham who is best known as father of utilitarianism. Mill does not agree with the social and political results which Bentham comes to through utilitarianism. Both of them supports that utilitarianism is the idea that the moral worth of an action is determined solely by its utility in providing happiness or pleasure as summed among all sentient beings, and they also accept that the things providing happiness are good, the things causing pain are bad. Although Bentham’s utilitarianism is made up the definition of human who only seeks his satisfactions of pleasures, Mill is alienated to this conception of utilitarianism and approves that human is a morally responsible creature. Contrary to Bentham who supports that same pleasures are present in every human being and it leans on physical pleasures, as Mill supports, some pleasures which make the human dignity explicit are more important than material pleasures. Man’s effort to have himself becomes more significant than to have basic pleasures. In this sense, in Mill’s theory, artistic, cultural and religious activities get ahead of effort to satisfy physical pleasures. Thus, man should be considered as a moral being. Contrary to Bentham who accepts the pleasures as separate from their experiences, we can say that moral values can be more important than physically satisfactions, additionally, the social and environmental effects on human which make man different from others cause that everybody have different satisfactory pleasures.

      The utilitarianism founds its theory on pleasures and pains. According to Bentham’s utilitarian perspective, as his greatest happiness principle supports,

          “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as...