Modern Piracy
Most of the media discussion about piracy in the Gulf of Aden has drifted understandably towards the sensational part of the story — how are the pirates able to roam the ocean? Is paying them ransom a better option than to engage them militarily? Last but not least, will a military intervention against the pirates worsen the situation; will it lead to a massive escalation in Somalia and a Vietnam-like quagmire for many years to come?
The armed bands on the waters still roaming the seas of Aden and the Indian Ocean across from Somalia and Kenya are not impressed with the dozens of naval units dispatched by powerful navies from around the world.
What is behind this piracy phenomenon, what lays ahead if the international community intervenes, and what could develop in that region if the latter is late to intervene or doesn't meet the challenge? It appears the strategic challenge is even bigger than the mere piracy. Indeed the strategy now contemplated by regional powers could become a major military debacle.
Here is why: these so-called Somali pirates are strategically different from their historical predecessors in the Caribbean, or from their contemporary colleagues in archipelagoes around the world. They aren't a vast collection of individual thugs, acting as bands replicating what successful sea gangs have accomplished for centuries before them. They are too many, operating from extremely long shores, all using similar methods, and are backed from hinterland forces.
They may seem like pirates as they seize ships and negotiate for the ransom. But these water thugs actually belong to a wider chess game. The grand ensemble of the army of little boats is in fact part of a regional Jihadi apparatus being deployed in the Horn of Africa and beyond. The Jihadi grand circle building in the region is not limited to the pirates but involves hostile forces from the mid-Red Sea to East Africa. The Somali pirates are merely one facet of this grand circle.
Ironically, the...
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